Despite these shortcomings, Guillen has provided a well-written and thoroughly researched history of three of the major paradigms in administrative science and does so for four diverse countries. By doing so, he manages to highlight the myopia of much organizational research, which often treats the history of U.S. administrative science as *the* history of administrative science and practice. By highlighting the importance of cross-national influences, he provides an exemplar for the field to follow. I would recommend the book to both academics and practitioners interested in the history of administrative science, as well as to those interested in analyzing future cross-national organizational change.

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The Employment Relationship: Causes and Consequences of Modern Personnel Administration.
William P. Bridges and Wayne J. Villemez. New York: Plenum, 1994. 241 pp. $34.50, cloth.

The Employment Relationship reports the results of an ambitious research project begun in the early 1980s, in which some 2,000 randomly sampled Chicago-area employees and their employers were surveyed about employment policies and conditions. The result is the fullest picture to date of how employment practices vary by sector, race, gender, occupation, labor-market characteristics, and a host of other factors. The authors begin by providing an overall picture of the practices organizations use and the practices that go together. They find five sets of practices, with five purposes: due process, bureaucratic work control, market sheltering, mobility assurance, and personnel formalization. Despite some overlap among these groups, Bridges and Villemez show that existing accounts of a singular bureaucratic employment system—often dubbed "internal labor market"—blur important distinctions. Many groups of employees, for instance, work under due-process guarantees without enjoying the market-sheltering and mobility-assurance practices that create internal labor markets.

The study shows the substantial explanatory leverage that can be achieved with data from two levels of analysis. The idea of putting together such a dataset was inspired, and the inspiration has paid off. Bridges and Villemez are able to address many of the looming questions in the field of work and occupations. The book is thick with new results, and the authors are refreshingly even-handed when dealing with diverse theories. The result is an undogmatic catalog of findings that will inform future research.

The most dramatic findings concern the kinds of employment systems men and women, blacks and whites,

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work under. It is perhaps not surprising that net of education, experience, and job training, white women are less likely than white men to hold jobs with built-in mechanisms for promotion. This is predicted by job-segregation theory and the "new home economics" alike. It is quite surprising, however, that black workers face no disadvantage in employment rights—that they are somewhat more likely than whites to work under formal promotion schemes and much more likely to work under due-process protections and bureaucratic work control. Bridges and Villemez make the novel argument that blacks seek bureaucratically governed jobs because their external labor market opportunities are constrained by discrimination. To confirm this, they demonstrate a negative relationship between internal and external labor market opportunities. It could be, of course, that blacks are more likely to enjoy bureaucratic employment protections because firms that offer such protections prevent discrimination in hiring.

What kinds of organizations bureaucratize employment? Efficiency concerns, as measured by size, labor-control concerns, as measured by unionization, and legitimation concerns, as measured by government domination, are key, as previous studies have shown. But here, as well, Bridges and Villemez come up with some surprises. Government domination, for instance, leads organizations to use due-process and bureaucratic control mechanisms. It does not cause them to add personnel departments. This undermines a seldom-tested premise of institutional theory: that public policy induces firms to install personnel offices to monitor and comply with emerging regulations.

When it comes to the effects of these practices, Bridges and Villemez's analyses are driven by one overarching question: Do employees make a tradeoff between employment stability and income? The answer is a conditional yes. In the private sector, there is a clear tradeoff between bureaucratic control of employment and earnings. In the public sector, there is no such tradeoff, but only because virtually all public sector jobs are subjected to bureaucratic control. Moreover, in terms of mobility chances, in the private sector being on a job ladder matters. In the public sector, being on a job ladder is not consequential because virtually all jobs are on ladders. What matters is what kind of ladder it is.

Bridges and Villemez have upped the empirical ante in studies of employment practices by introducing independent survey data from thousands of employees and from their employers. Their research design provides a model for the future, and fortuitously, data from a like national study—the National Organizational Survey, spearheaded by Arne Kalleberg, David Knoke, Peter Marsden, and Joe Spaeth—have recently become available.

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